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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [KPKO](#) [CG](#)

SUBJECT: SHORTLEY OFFERS ASSISTANCE PROPOSAL TO FOREIGN
MINISTER MBUSA NYAMWISI

REF: A. A. E-MAIL FROM CHARGE SAM BROCK TO A/S JENDAYI

FRAZER

[1](#)B. SEPT. 12

[1](#)C. 2007

[1](#)D. B. KINSHASA 1072

[1](#)E. C. KINSHASA 1056

Classified By: Charge S.Brock (1.4 b/d).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: Timothy Shortley, Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution to Jendayi Frazer, AF A/S, met with Congolese Foreign Minister Mbusa Nyamwisi on September 12 to discuss efforts to resolve the ongoing crisis in eastern Congo. Charge Sam Brock and PolCouns also participated. Shortley delivered a direct message from the A/S and offered the assistance of the USG in facilitating dialogue with dissident General Nkunda, and extending state authority and re-establishing civilian control in eastern DRC. Mbusa was receptive to the offer and agreed to present the proposal to President Kabila. End summary.

[1](#)2. (C) Foreign Minister Mbusa Nyamwisi met with the Charge and Timothy Shortley, on September 12. Shortley delivered three primary messages from A/S Jendayi Frazer to Foreign Minister Mbusa Nyamwisi:

- A/S for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer wishes to strengthen the bilateral relations between the USG and the GDRC. As part of this, the USG wants to increase the visibility and the level of meetings between the two governments.

- The USG wants to increase the capacity of the GDRC to extend its authority in eastern DRC through the decentralization process. Specifically, the USG wants to help the GDRC provide protection, goods and services to the Congolese people in eastern DRC.

- The USG would like to provide security assistance to the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) to help the GDRC defend its sovereign territory against the negative forces currently creating instability in eastern DRC.

[1](#)3. (C) In addition to these three points, Shortley stated that the U.S. is prepared to facilitate dialogue with Nkunda, and in coordination with the Tripartite Plus, deepen our coordination toward eliminating foreign negative forces including the LRA, FDLR and ADF.

¶4. (C) Mbusa responded favorably to this offer, and was enthusiastic about presenting this proposal to Kabila. He stated that the recent military activity in the East had served as a "reality check," and that the GDRC has come to the understanding that a military solution is not feasible. Mbusa noted that:

- Both short-term and long-term plans related to security in the East need a "calm space" to develop. This is the right time to address the insecurity, and the GDRC needs "all the help they can get."

- Although Mbusa initially declared that he was "not sure how we can accommodate Nkunda," he later stated that "exile was the preferred option." Mbusa stated that he had spoken with Nkunda as recently as three weeks ago, and that his demands continue to be unacceptable. Mbusa characterized Nkunda as "full of himself" and "convinced that he could win militarily."

- Nkunda,s men must be given the opportunity to fully integrate into the FARDC (rather than "mix" into non-integrated brigades). After that, it will be time to move against the FDLR/ex-Interahamwe who remain in the DRC.

¶5. (C) Mbusa stressed that diplomatic pressure is needed on the five people implicated in Arusha (e.g., those expatriates facilitating continued aggression through the negative armed forces in the East). In addition, Mbusa stated that the international community needs to increase pressure on Kigali to the extent possible to create more incentives for ex-Interahamwe based in the DRC to return to Rwanda. Although not all will want to return to Rwanda, their presence in the DRC continues the potential for aggression

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against the Congolese people.

¶6. (C) Mbusa stated that he would meet with President Kabila later that evening, and would request direct, express consent for this new initiative.

¶7. (C) Shortley and Charge Sam Brock discussed this initiative with SRSG William Swing at length. Swing also welcomed the initiative (septel) and is willing to lend MONUC,s logistics capacity to facilitate travel and security as necessary.

¶8. (C) Comment: The U.S. proposal to facilitate dialogue with Nkunda and support provincial governments in eastern DRC comes at the right time. As reported in reftels, the increased militarization of eastern DRC has led to a standoff in which neither party can clearly "win," yet from which neither party will willingly back down. The proposal provides the GDRC with a needed option to lean on the U.S. for diplomatic and political assistance at this critical time. The GDRC has re-assessed its strategy to achieve a "military solution" and is looking for assistance to reduce tensions and avoid an all-out war. End comment.

¶9. (C) Mr. Shortley has seen and cleared this cable.
BROCK